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SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
TO EDUCATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
INADEQUACIES OF WISCONSIN’S EXPULSION LAWS 
Maria M. Lewis, J.D., Ph.D. Candidate* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked in 
Madison Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County whether a district court has the authority to order a 
school district to provide educational services to an expelled 
student who has been adjudicated delinquent.1 In a narrow 
holding, the court determined that the district court had 
exceeded its authority by ordering “a school district to provide 
alternative educational services to a juvenile who has been 
expelled from school . . . but is still residing in the 
community.”2 Following this decision, the State Bar of 
Wisconsin published an article titled “School Districts Need 
Not Provide Alternative Education to Expelled Students.”3 This 
assertion overstates and consequently inadequately portrays 
the court’s holding. In fact, the question regarding a student’s 
legal right to alternative education was not directly before the 
court in Madison Metropolitan School District.4 
In order for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to sufficiently 
determine a student’s right to post-expulsion services, it is 
 
* Maria M. Lewis, J.D., Ph.D. Candidate in Educational Leadership and Policy 
Analysis, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author wishes to thank Dr. Julie Mead 
for her support and helpful suggestions during the writing process. 
 1 Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty, 800 N.W. 2d 442, 442 
(Wis. 2011).  
 2 Id. at 459. 
 3 Joe Forward, School Districts Need Not Provide Alternative Education to 
Expelled Students, St. B. Wis. (2011), 
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/pages/general-article.aspx?articleid=4709. 
(“The majority concluded that while school districts may be encouraged to provide 
alternative education to expelled students, certain provisions of the Juvenile Justice 
Code do not override the District’s explicit authority to expel students and refuse 
further educational services.”). 
 4 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d 442. 
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necessary to explore the origin of the right to an education in 
the state of Wisconsin. A thorough examination would include 
an analysis of the state constitution and its relationship to the 
state’s expulsion laws—an analysis that was absent from the 
court’s opinion in Madison Metropolitan School District. 
Instead, the court focused its attention on the district court’s 
authority to compel a school district to provide educational 
services to a student who had been lawfully expelled, which 
was an appropriate focus in light of the questions it was asked 
to answer.5 Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court left 
the following separate but related questions unanswered: 
1. Are Wisconsin statutes that allow for permanent 
expulsion constitutional under the state constitution? 
2. When, if at all, are students entitled to post-expulsion 
services or alternative education in the state of Wisconsin? 
3. If Wisconsin expulsion statutes are found to be 
unconstitutional, in what ways can the state legislature modify 
the state’s expulsion laws so that they are supported by the 
state constitution? 
This article seeks to answer each one of these questions 
through a comprehensive examination of relevant federal and 
state law. This article will begin with an in-depth discussion of 
Madison Metropolitan School District, placing particular 
emphasis on the court’s understanding of school districts’ 
authority to expel students. The second section of this article 
will discuss relevant federal and state law, including the 
federal and state constitutions, which will demonstrate that 
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws fail to meet the high standard to 
which they must be held. After establishing the inadequacy of 
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws, the third section of this paper will 
be devoted to providing examples of analogous case law in 
other states to further illustrate the legal infirmities of 
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and to provide a basis for potential 
revisions. The fourth section will discuss some ways that the 
Wisconsin state legislature could amend the statutes to reflect 
the legal importance of education in the state of Wisconsin. The 
fifth and final section will provide guidance to administrators 
who wish to expediently correct the problem at the local level.6 
 
 5 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d 442. 
 6 It is important to note that although significant research demonstrates the 
value of educational interventions and strategies that seek to prevent or correct 
behavioral problems that lead to expulsions, such strategies are outside the scope of 
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The purpose of this article is to encourage a closer look at 
the important role that the status of education as a 
fundamental right7 should play in assessing the 
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws. It is important 
to note that the goal is not to challenge Wisconsin school 
districts’ authority to expel students. Rather, the objective is to 
engage in the type of robust legal analysis that is necessary to 
justify a violation of a fundamental right, such as education in 
the state of Wisconsin. This analysis will expose the 
deficiencies in Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and, in turn, the 
need for revisions that strike a balance between a student’s 
right to an education and school district authority to discipline 
students for behavior that threatens school safety or 
significantly interferes with the school district’s educational 
mission. 
II. MADISON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
In order to reach its final decision in Madison Metropolitan 
School District, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on district 
court opinions, statutory construction, and the authority of the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI), the state’s 
education agency, to determine that the circuit court exceeded 
its authority when it attempted to force Madison Metropolitan 
School District (MMSD) to provide educational services to a 
student who had been legally expelled.8 The state constitution 
is a foundational source of authority in the creation of a 
student’s right to education, though the court failed to consider 
it in its decision.9 Instead, the case focused on the Juvenile 
Justice Code and its relationship to districts’ statutory 
authority to expel students.10 
Both the Juvenile Justice Code and its relationship to 
statutory authority are undoubtedly important to analyzing the 
facts before the court in Madison Metropolitan School District, 
but they ultimately fall short of resolving the question over the 
 
this article. Instead, this article assumes that decision makers have exhausted these 
options.   
 7 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2000); 
 8 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Id. at 449. 
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relationship between the state’s expulsion laws and the 
fundamental right to an education. Nonetheless, the case has 
been understood by some to mean that school districts are 
under no legal obligation to provide educational services upon 
expulsion.11 The following analysis will explain why such an 
interpretation of Madison Metropolitan School District is 
misguided insofar as it overstates the question before the court 
and reaches an erroneous conclusion without engaging in the 
kind of rigorous analysis that is necessary to resolve such an 
important legal question. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
On June 5, 2009, M.T., a fifteen-year-old student at the 
time, brought nine bags of marijuana to Madison East High 
School.12 As a result, M.T. was arrested and charged with 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.13 Finding that 
the conduct was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements 
for expulsion, an independent hearing officer issued an order 
granting the school administration’s request for expulsion to 
last three semesters.14 After one semester, M.T. was eligible for 
reinstatement, provided that he met certain conditions.15 The 
District Board of Education approved the order.16 A separate 
proceeding began on July 9, 2009. The judge assigned to the 
case ordered the Dane County Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHS) to provide a predisposition report, 
which according to Wisconsin statutes must include “[a] plan 
for the provision of educational services to the juvenile, 
prepared after consultation with the staff of the school in which 
the juvenile is enrolled or the last school in which the juvenile 
was enrolled.”17 Despite DHS’s recommendation that M.T. 
attend school, the school district refused.18 The school district 
even refused to provide materials for home schooling.19 
 
 11 Forward, supra note 3.  
 12 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d at 445. 
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. (Under Wis. Stat. §120.13(1)(e), as an alternative to general procedures, a 
school board has the authority to appoint an independent hearing officer to make 
determinations regarding expulsions.)   
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e).) 
 18 Id.   
 19 Id. at 446.  
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After multiple unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement 
between the judge, DHS, and the Madison Metropolitan School 
District (MMSD), the judge issued an order that required the 
school district to provide M.T. with educational services.20 
MMSD agreed to provide ten hours a week of direct instruction, 
which was consistent with the judge’s order that the services be 
“not less than those provided in the Dane County Juvenile 
Detention Center.”21 After its motion for reconsideration was 
denied, the school district appealed.22 On appeal, the court of 
appeals vacated the circuit court order that required MMSD to 
provide educational services.23 
B. Analysis 
The primary legal question before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court was as follows: Did the district court act within its 
authority when it ordered that MMSD to provide alternative 
educational services to a student who had been expelled from 
school?24 In order to answer this question, the court first 
discussed the legal authority under which school districts can 
discipline students.25 The court held that Wisconsin Statute 
§120.13(1)(c)1 grants Wisconsin school districts express 
authority to expel students from school.26 Although the term 
“expel” is not defined in Wisconsin Statute §120.13,27 the court 
relied on the state education agency’s longstanding 
interpretation of school districts’ obligations, finding that “a 
school district bears no responsibility for providing an 
education to expelled students.”28 In other words, expulsion 
means to expel students from all educational services. 
 
 20 Id. at 447.  
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. at 448.  
 23 Id. (Specifically, the court of appeals granted MMSD’s writ of prohibition, 
which required MMSD to satisfy five criteria “(1) an appeal would be an utterly 
inadequate remedy; (2) the duty of the circuit court is plain; (3) its refusal to act within 
the line such duty or its intent to act in violation of such duty is clear; (4) the results of 
the circuit court’s action would not only be prejudicial, but also incur extraordinary 
hardship; and (5) the request for relief was made promptly and speedily.” Id. at 457.). 
 24 Id. at 444. 
 25 Id. at 449–51. 
 26 Id. at 449. 
 27 WIS. STAT. §120.13 
 28 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d at 450 (citing Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 
2d 665, 668 n.3 (E.D.Wis. 2001)). 
Lewis Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/4/14  11:26 PM 
46 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
In fact, the court went so far as to accept as law the state 
education agency’s conclusion that “a failure to provide such 
alternative education is not a violation of an expelled student’s 
constitutional rights.”29 The court presumed the 
constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws in order to reach 
its final decision. Specifically, the court stated that “[i]n 
general, expulsion from a Wisconsin public school district 
removes a pupil’s right to receive a free public education from 
any Wisconsin public school.”30 This blind acceptance without 
proper corresponding legal analysis disregards a vital legal 
question and improperly bestows upon the state education 
agency the authority to determine the reach of the state 
constitution—a responsibility that should be left to the courts. 
The circuit court based its position on the authority granted 
to it through the Juvenile Justice Code.31 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found that although the circuit court had the 
authority to order the student educational programming under 
Wisconsin Statute 938.34(7d), such authority is not so far 
reaching that it permits the court to order a school district to 
provide the programming.32 In the end, the court held that the 
circuit court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered 
MMSD to provide post-expulsion services.33 
The narrative of Madison Metropolitan School District 
demonstrates that it is not advisable to treat the case as 
though it stands for the assertion that Wisconsin school 
districts are unequivocally not required to provide post-
expulsion services. Related but distinct from the narrow 
question before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a 
comprehensive analysis of the state’s obligation with regard to 
education requires an in-depth examination of the relationship 
between the state’s expulsion statutes and the fundamental 
right to education under the State Constitution. This rigorous 
analysis exposes the inadequacies of Wisconsin’s expulsion 
laws. As the following sections demonstrate, there are several 
 
 29 Id. at 451 (citing C.M. v. Kenosha Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Superintendent of 
Pub. Instruction Decision and Order No. 616 (Apr. 17, 2008)). 
 30 Id. at 451 (citing Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Answers to 
Frequently Asked School Discipline Questions, 
http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf). 
 31 1995 WIS. ACT 77.  
 32 Id. at 453.  
 33 Id.  
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ways the Wisconsin State Legislature can amend its expulsion 
laws to correct the statutes’ current constitutional flaws. 
Mandating the provision of post-expulsion services, at least in 
most circumstances, is just one approach that the Wisconsin 
state legislature can take to achieve compliance with the state 
constitution. Before reaching the policy alternatives, however, 
it is first necessary to lay out the legal foundation for the 
insufficiency of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws as they exist today. 
III. RELEVANT FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that children do not have 
a right to an education under the U.S. Constitution.34 
Nonetheless, in Goss v. Lopez, the court held that students are 
entitled to due process under the 14th Amendment when 
education has been deemed to be a statutory right as it was in 
Ohio.35 In Goss, nine students were suspended for up to ten 
days without a hearing.36 The Court held that “[h]aving chosen 
to extend the right to an education to people of appellees’ class 
generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of 
misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine 
whether the misconduct has occurred.”37 
The Court determined that students facing suspension were 
entitled to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.”38 
Although the Court was dealing primarily with suspensions 
shorter than ten days, the Court did state that more robust 
procedures may be required in the case of long-term 
suspensions or expulsions.39 As such, the severity of 
disciplinary action, combined with the state-designated right to 
education, served as the foundation for the Court’s analysis in 
Goss. 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that 
education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. 
 
 34 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 35 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 36 Id. at 568.   
 37 Id. at 574.  
 38 Id. at 579.  
 39 Id. at 584.  
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Constitution,40 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has deemed 
education to be a fundamental right in the state of Wisconsin.41 
Article X, section 3 of the Wisconsin State Constitution states 
that “[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly 
uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and 
without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 
and 20 years.”42 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s discussions 
about and ultimate definition of students’ right to an education 
have occurred in the context of school finance litigation where 
the court has examined the state legislature’s obligations under 
the state constitution.43 The most recent case was Vincent v. 
Voight, decided in 2000.44 In Voight, the plaintiffs challenged 
Wisconsin’s finance system under the state constitution’s 
uniformity clause of the education article and the state’s equal 
protection clause, arguing that the system failed to equalize 
educational funding provided to districts throughout the 
state.45 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the school 
finance system violated neither of the constitutional 
provisions.46 From the court’s perspective, the funding system 
supplied adequate funding to provide a basic education to 
students across the state.47 Funding disparities were attributed 
to districts raising revenue above the amount guaranteed by 
the state.48 
On the issue of equal protection, the court analyzed the 
appropriateness of applying the standard of strict scrutiny.49 
The court reasoned that it is proper to “apply a strict scrutiny 
review of a statute when the legislative classification interferes 
with a fundamental right or is created on the basis of a suspect 
criterion.”50 However, relying on San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the 
Voight court drew an important distinction between “the 
 
 40 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 41 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2000); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.  
 42 WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
 43 Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W. 2d 141 (Wis. 1976); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469 
(Wis. 1989). 
 44 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2011). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id at 396.  
 47 Id. at 408.  
 48 Id. at 413. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. (citing State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468 (1992)). 
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fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education under art. X, § 3 and the wealth-based arguments” 
made by the plaintiffs.51 The court recalled its reasoning in 
Kukor v. Grover, where it “concluded that a rational basis 
standard should be applied ‘because the rights at issue in the 
case before the court are premised upon spending disparities 
and not upon a complete denial of educational opportunity 
within the scope of art. X.’”52 Although the court decided to apply 
the rational basis test in Voight, its analysis is particularly 
important to the discussion of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws 
because it implies that a more rigorous standard would be 
appropriate in instances involving a complete deprivation of 
educational opportunity—which is the case for expulsions.53 
Furthermore, the court held that students have a 
“fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic 
education.”54 The court specifically described that right as 
being one that “will equip students for their roles as citizens 
and enable them to succeed economically and personally.”55 The 
court stated 
[t]he legislature has articulated a standard for equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 
118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997−98) as the opportunity for 
students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and 
writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive 
instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social 
sciences, health, physical education and foreign language, in 
accordance with their age and aptitude.56 
Expulsion without educational services, especially in the case 
of permanent expulsion, undoubtedly interferes with a 
 
 51 Id. at 414. 
 52 Id. (citing Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498 (Wis. 1989)).  
 53 To apply a rational basis review in the context of school expulsion risks 
rendering the characterization of education as a fundamental right to an equal 
opportunity to a sound basic education meaningless. If a rigorous standard such as 
strict scrutiny is improper in the context of school finance litigation, as the court found 
in Voight and in situations where disciplinary action results in a complete deprivation 
of educational services, it is difficult to imagine a realistic set of facts in which 
education’s fundamental status in the state of Wisconsin would have more than a 
purely theoretical value as it relates to asserting that right.  
 54 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, at ¶ 87. (Wis. 2011). 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id.  
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student’s ability to “succeed economically and personally”57 and 
permits districts, and therefore the state, to abandon their 
constitutional obligations to students throughout the state of 
Wisconsin. 
A. Wisconsin Statutory Authority 
Wisconsin statutes grant school districts express authority 
to expel students.58 The duration of a students’ expulsion can 
be permanent; no other school district is required to enroll an 
expelled student while that student is under an expulsion 
order.59 Behaviors that constitute expellable conduct are 
extremely important to Wisconsin students’ access to 
education. Unfortunately, the expulsion statutes fail to account 
for the severe impact that such a decision can have on a 
student’s future. According to the statute, students face the 
possibility of expulsion if the school district finds the following: 
[R]epeated refusal or neglect to obey the rules, or finds that a 
pupil knowingly conveyed or caused to be conveyed any threat 
or false information concerning an attempt or alleged attempt 
being made or to be made to destroy any school property by 
means of explosives, or finds that the pupil engaged in 
conduct while at school or while under the supervision of a 
school authority which endangered the property, health or 
safety of others, or finds that a pupil while not at school or 
while not under the supervision of a school authority engaged 
in conduct which endangered the property, health or safety of 
others at school or under the supervision of a school authority 
or endangered the property, health or safety of any employee 
or school board member of the school district in which the 
pupil is enrolled, and is satisfied that the interest of the 
school demands the pupil’s expulsion.60 
Although some of the grounds for expulsion are fairly 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 WIS. STAT. § 120.13. 
 59 WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(f).  
 60 WIS. STAT § 120.13(1)(c)(1). (Furthermore, even if the conditions are not met 
under this section, students 16 and older can be expelled if the student “repeatedly 
engaged in conduct while at school or while under the supervision of a school authority 
that disrupted the ability of school authorities to maintain order or an educational 
atmosphere at school or at an activity supervised by a school authority and . . . is 
satisfied that the interest of the school demands the pupil’s expulsion.” WIS. STAT. § 
120.13(1)(c)2.) 
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specific, “repeated refusal or neglect to obey the rules” 61 is an 
all-encompassing stipulation that permits expulsion in 
circumstances that may not meet the rigorous standard to 
which a fundamental right such as education is held. “The 
rules” implies any rules, thus permitting a school district to 
permanently deprive a student of his or her right to an 
education based on an arbitrary determination.62 While there 
may be rare instances where a complete deprivation of a 
student’s right to education is legally justified in light of 
serious safety concerns,63 the inclusion of expulsions for benign 
behaviors fails to meet the rigorous legal standard applied in 
cases involving a fundamental right. 
It is important to note that the authority to deny 
enrollment to a student who has been expelled only applies to 
students who have been expelled by a public school.64 A 
reasonable explanation for the distinction between public and 
private schools is as follows: the obligation to provide an 
education rests upon the state. Therefore, only a public school 
can take away the public right to an education. Nonetheless, 
students who have been expelled from a private school are 
entitled to public education, no matter how serious the offense 
that motivated the exclusion may have been.65 In essence, two 
students may face different consequences for committing the 
same offense, one in a private setting and the other in a public 
setting. One of the students may be deemed to be too 
dangerous (public school student who is left without an 
education) while the other must be provided an education 
(private school student who is provided a public education). 
This irrational outcome indeed weakens the argument that 
previously expelled students present such a danger to the 
school district that educational services simply cannot be 
provided. 
As stated above, in cases involving a fundamental right, a 
 
 61 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, at ¶ 80. (Wis. 2011). 
 62 See id. 
 63 For example, Wisconsin Statutes require expulsion for “not less than one 
year” for possession of a firearm. WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(c)(2)(m).   
 64 WIS. STAT §120.13(1)(f).  
 65 Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Answers to Frequently Asked 
School Discipline Questions, http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf. 
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standard of strict scrutiny applies.66 Strict scrutiny requires 
that the action be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state 
interest.67 In the context of school discipline, the state certainly 
has a compelling state interest in maintaining a safe 
educational environment that is unhampered by serious 
disruptions. Applying strict scrutiny, Wisconsin statutes, as 
written, violate the state constitution insofar as they allow for 
expulsion without services for offenses that cannot be justified 
in light of the nature of the right to education in the state of 
Wisconsin. 
An example will help to illustrate the breadth of the law 
and, in turn, the constitutional violation.68 In 2006, a student 
was expelled for refusing to cover up a tattoo that was offensive 
and violent in nature.69 Under the law as it is written, a school 
district is free to expel this student permanently without 
educational services. In regard to the school district’s interest 
in maintaining a safe environment, a tattoo by itself is not 
violent. Therefore, the law is overbroad in that it permits 
expulsion for offenses that do not meet the government’s safety 
interest. Even granting for the sake of argument that the 
compelling state interest portion of the strict scrutiny analysis 
is met for such an offense, permanent expulsion without 
services for failure to cover up a tattoo fails to meet the narrow 
tailoring portion of the analysis. There are other less restrictive 
means for the state to achieve its intended goal of providing a 
safe environment that allows students to learn. Alternative 
educational programming and conditional reinstatement 
provide some potential options. Although appeal to the state 
superintendent is available to students facing expulsion, 
substantive questions regarding the severity of the disciplinary 
 
 66 Voight, 614 N.W. 2d at 413; see also State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468 
(1992). 
 67 Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Kelli B.,  678 N.W. 2d 831, ¶ 17 (Wis. 
2004).   
 68 See also Gilbert J. Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion Digest, Wisconsin 
Association of School Boards, available at 
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 69 H.H. by the West Allis School District, (571) April 21, 2006. See Gilbert J. 
Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion Digest, Wisconsin Association of School Boards, 
available at 
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
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measures is not within the state superintendent’s authority.70 
Therefore, if procedural requirements are met and the actions 
fall within the easily achievable statutory requirements, appeal 
to the state superintendent is futile. 
B. Education in the State of Wisconsin 
A broad examination of the status of the law as it relates to 
the provision of educational services further emphasizes the 
inadequacies inherent in Wisconsin’s expulsion laws. Taking 
the state’s Juvenile Justice Code and federal special education 
law into consideration, only a narrowly defined group of 
students are excluded from educational services in the state of 
Wisconsin. In tandem with Wisconsin educational statute 
§120.12(18), Wisconsin Statute §938.34 ensures educational 
programming for children who have been adjudicated 
delinquent.71 This decision to provide children who have 
committed serious offenses with an education reinforces the 
state’s prioritization of education. Furthermore, federal special 
education law guarantees that students with disabilities 
receive educational services upon expulsion.72 Consequently, 
both the Juvenile Justice Code and federal special education 
law stress the importance of providing educational services 
with limited interruptions, an outcome that stands in stark 
contrast to students who fall outside these categories. This 
categorization ultimately excludes them from state-provided 
educational services for an indefinite period of time. 
Taken as a whole, the state of Wisconsin abandons a 
 
 70 Roy H. by the Blair School Dist., (159) Sept. 26, 1988 (p.11); Douglas S. by the 
Neenah School Dist., (162) May 23, 1989; Kristin J.P. by the Mukwonago Area School 
Dist., (185) Feb. 21, 1992  (p. 12). See Gilbert J. Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion 
Digest, Wisconsin Association of School Boards, 
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013). See also Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 
Answers to Frequently Asked School Discipline Questions, p.9, 
http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf). 
 71 WIS. STAT. §938.34. Furthermore, juveniles who are tried and sentenced as 
adults also have educational services available to them in adult prisons. See Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections, Opportunities and Options Resource Guide, Jan. 7, 2011, 
www.wi-doc.com/index_adult.htm. 
 72 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1)(A). See Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446  (stating that students with disabilities 
are entitled to a free appropriate public education even while under an expulsion 
order).  
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narrowly defined group of students without educational 
services—students without disabilities who commit offenses 
that are not quite serious enough to warrant involvement with 
the juvenile justice system but sufficient to meet the 
ambiguous standard for expulsion under the state’s expulsion 
laws. A system that permits arbitrary exclusion from 
educational services, made possible through Wisconsin’s 
broadly written expulsion laws, undermines the state’s 
longstanding commitment to education that gave rise to 
education being deemed a fundamental right. It is difficult to 
imagine how such an outcome meets even the less demanding 
standard of rational basis review, which merely requires the 
court to determine whether the law “rationally furthers a 
purpose identified by the legislature.”73 
C. Relevant Expulsion Case Law in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin state courts have not addressed the 
constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws. However, in an 
unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin held that “[d]enying a child an 
opportunity for an education is the most onerous penalty 
society can impose. Unlike incarceration which ends, 
permanent expulsion shackles the student with the chains of 
ignorance.”74 That case involved a student, R.T., who injured 
another student with a knife, requiring 300 stitches.75 Initially 
R.T. was suspended.76 The juvenile court found that she was 
delinquent and ordered that she be sent to a juvenile detention 
facility.77 She was later transferred to a residential home.78 
While R.T. was in the residential home, the school district held 
an expulsion hearing in which the hearing officer determined 
that expulsion was the appropriate punishment.79 The court 
opinion noted that the hearing officer did not make a finding as 
to whether R.T. was a threat to other students or employees.80 
 
 73 Voight, 614 N.W. 2d at 413 (citing State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468).  
 74 Tate v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., No. 96-C-0524, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22723 (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. D. of Wis. Aug. 15, 1996). 
 75 Id. at 3.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 4. 
 80 Id.  
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This was an important factor in the court’s analysis because 
R.T.’s attorney argued that “she had been rehabilitated.”81 
Because the school district ignored mitigating evidence, 
particularly R.T.’s evidence of rehabilitation, the court 
determined that R.T. sufficiently established a likelihood that 
the school district violated R.T.’s procedural due process 
rights.82 Specifically, the court stated, “[t]he State of Wisconsin 
thinks the right to an education is so important that it has 
enshrined it in the State Constitution. The District may not 
ignore this right; and the United States Constitution requires 
that the District provide due process before denying R.T. that 
right.”83 
Furthermore, the court directed the school district to 
provide R.T. with substantive due process.84 Specifically, the 
court ordered that the school district hold a reinstatement 
hearing to determine whether or not R.T. continued to present 
a threat to students and teachers in light of her good behavior 
during her time in the juvenile justice system.85 The court went 
so far as to argue in favor of finding alternative means to 
provide educational services in the event that R.T. remained a 
safety threat.86 Specifically, the court ordered that the school 
district provide homebound instruction “or any other option 
that provides her an education” under such circumstances.87 
Permanent deprivation of educational services in this case, the 
court determined, would be arbitrary and capricious.88 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion in Remer v. Burlington, where the court 
rejected a substantive due process claim in a superficial 
examination that took up no more than a half of a page of 
analysis.89 Similar to Madison Metropolitan School District, the 
court in Remer failed to address the relationship between the 
fundamental right to an education and the state’s expulsion 
 
 81 Id. at 5.  
 82 Id. at 10. 
 83 Id. at 18.  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 18−19. 
 86 Id. at 19. 
 87 Id. at 20.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).  
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laws.90 Instead, in what appeared to be an insignificant 
afterthought, the court summarily upheld the expulsion of a 
student who was permanently expelled in an effort to maintain 
a safe learning environment.91 As such, no court has directly 
addressed the constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws or 
examined whether expulsion without services is permissible 
when the offense relates to a benign refusal to follow the rules 
rather than a drug or weapons offense. 
Recognizing the draconian nature of Wisconsin’s expulsion 
laws, Disability Rights Wisconsin filed a lawsuit against 
Oregon School District in February 2012 challenging the 
constitutionality of the statutory provision that allows school 
districts to reject enrollment of a student who has been 
lawfully expelled by another school district.92 While this case is 
still early in the litigation process, it has the potential to work 
its way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the court will 
be faced head on with a question that it was able to avoid in 
Madison Metropolitan School District in 2011. 
IV. RELEVANT CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Although Wisconsin case law on this topic is limited, 
analogous case law from other states demonstrate the need for 
change in Wisconsin. In particular, relevant case law from 
additional states illustrates the significance of the state’s 
education clause in the resolution of a student’s right to post-
expulsion services. Specifically, these cases reinforce the 
importance of the characterization of the right to an education 
in the contest over students’ entitlement to educational 
services upon expulsion. This section will discuss cases from 
five other states to further expose the inadequacies of 
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and to provide insight into ways in 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1014.  
 92 Patricia L et al vs. Oregon Sch. Dist., 2012CV000452  (Dane Cnty Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 17, 2012), available at 
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/courtRecordEvents.xsl;jsessionid=0ECBD95A061E91D50E534
C24839ABBEF.render6?caseNo=2012CV000452&countyNo=13&cacheId=80E76408839
904630741E1042C3B15A9&recordCount=27&offset=3&linkOnlyToForm=false&sortDi
rection=DESC. The case was dismissed and the plaintiffs have appealed the lower 
court’s decision, 2013AP000293 (Dane Cnty App. Ct.), available at 
http://wscca.wicourts.gov/caseDetails.do?caseNo=2013AP000293&cacheId=CB562B5A1
885CE5AFF044EBC498828CC&recordCount=1&offset=0. 
Lewis Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/4/14  11:26 PM 
1] SCHOOL DISCIPLINE / RIGHT TO EDUCATION 57 
 
which Wisconsin can repair its legal defects. As the following 
analysis will show, the outcome of relevant case law depends 
upon the legal standard that the court applies, the duration of 
the expulsion in question, and what constitutes an expellable 
offense under the law. 
A. The Right To An Education Extends To Alternative 
Education Or Post-Expulsion Services 
The case that most closely resembles Madison Metropolitan 
School District is State ex rel. G.S, a case out of New Jersey.93 
Although a lower court opinion, its analysis is particularly 
instructive. The facts involved a student who participated in a 
false bomb threat that led to his expulsion from his school 
district.94 Through juvenile proceedings, the court ordered 
probation conditions that included regular school attendance 
and a high school diploma.95 The expulsion order itself was not 
under review.96 Instead, the court was interested in whether a 
student who has been legally expelled from his school is 
nonetheless entitled to public education of some sort.97 Unlike 
Madison Metropolitan School District, the court in G.S. relied 
on the state constitutional right to education to inform its legal 
analysis.98 Reaching the opposite result of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, the New Jersey court determined that 
“expulsion of an adjudicated juvenile by his local school board 
does not sound the death knell for his constitutional right to 
receive alternative education in another setting.”99 The court 
considered the fact that students who commit the most serious 
offenses are provided an education in juvenile detention 
centers.100 The legislature had even passed a law that required 
the provision of alternative education for “juveniles who had 
been adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation for 
[incidents involving] possession or use of a firearm,” an action 
which the court attributed to a recognition of the state’s 
 
 93 State ex rel. G.S., 330 N.J. Super. 383 (Ch. Div. 2000). 
 94 Id. at 386−87. 
 95 Id. at 386−87.  
 96 Id. at 388. 
 97 Id. at 388−89.  
 98 Id. at 392. 
 99 Id. at 394.  
 100 Id. at 393.  
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obligation to provide an education.101 
Similarly, juveniles in Wisconsin who commit serious 
offenses receive an education in an alternative setting under 
the Juvenile Justice Code.102 Consequently, the status of the 
law in Wisconsin permits students who commit the most 
serious and dangerous offenses to receive an education while 
students who commit less serious offenses face the possibility 
of exclusion from educational services entirely. This 
discrepancy arguably fails to meet even a rational basis. 
B. Provide Post-Expulsion Services For All But The Most 
Serious Offenses 
By comparison, in Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
the West Virginia Supreme Court carved out a narrow 
exception to the constitutionally granted right to education.103 
The case analyzed the Productive and Safe Schools Act of 1995, 
which required removal from school for up to 12 months for 
students who brought weapons to school.104 The court 
determined that mandatory expulsion was facially 
constitutional in light of safety concerns and to create a 
sufficient deterrent.105 The court found 
in all but the most extreme cases the State will be able to 
provide reasonable state-funded educational opportunities 
and services to children who have been removed from the 
classroom by the provisions of the Safe Schools Act in a safe 
and reasonable fashion. Under such circumstances, providing 
educational opportunities and services to such children is 
constitutionally mandated.106 
This decision to create a narrow exception marked a change in 
the court’s prior stance, which, until Cathe A., implied that 
students were entitled to services in all cases.107 
To reach its decision, the court applied a strict scrutiny 
standard.108 The court warned against a “constitutionally 
infirm” conclusion that the state is under no obligation to 
 
 101 Id.  
 102 WIS. STAT. § 938.34(7d) (2012).  
 103 Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (1997). 
 104 Id. at 344.  
 105 Id. at 348.  
 106 Id. at 351.  
 107 Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier  Co. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909 (1996). 
 108 Doddridge, S.E.2d at 346−47.  
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provide any education to all students facing expulsion under 
the Productive and Safe Schools Act.109 On the contrary, the 
state remained convinced that there were likely factual 
circumstances that may require the provision of educational 
services even under the Productive and Safe Schools Act.110 
Wisconsin’s expulsion statutes would not pass 
constitutional muster under the standard applied in Cathe A. If 
the court in Cathe A. failed to find that the temporary 
interruption of services for all students who bring a weapon to 
school fulfills the standard of strict scrutiny, it is difficult to see 
how permanent expulsion for even minor offenses can be 
legally justified in Wisconsin, where, similar to West Virginia, 
strict scrutiny is the appropriate legal standard.111 
C. Place Limitations On The Duration Of Expulsions 
Some states have determined that the right to education 
does not extend to students facing expulsion. Nonetheless, 
these cases are beneficial to a thorough analysis of Wisconsin’s 
expulsion laws because they illustrate the severity of 
Wisconsin’s laws as compared to other states. Consequently, 
the factual distinctions reinforce the need for Wisconsin to 
change its laws both from a legal and policy perspective. 
For example, in a recent case involving a student who was 
given a semester long suspension for fighting, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court held that even though students have a 
statutory right to alternative education, this right is not 
guaranteed under the state constitution.112 Finding that strict 
scrutiny unnecessarily infringes on the decision-making 
authority of administrators and rational basis review fails to 
adequately protect students from arbitrary decisions, the court 
applied intermediate scrutiny.113 Accordingly, in order to 
satisfy the legal standard for a denial of services in North 
Carolina, administrators “must articulate an important or 
significant reason for denying students access to alternative 
education.”114 The court reasoned that this standard allows 
 
 109 Id. at 350. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 King v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259 (2010). 
 113 Id. at 263−65.  
 114 Id. at 265.   
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school districts to strike a balance between school safety and 
the right to educational services.115 
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that students 
were not entitled to educational services for the duration of 
their yearlong expulsion.116 However, the short-term nature of 
the expulsion was an important factor in the court’s analysis. 
In fact, Wyoming statutes permitted a maximum expulsion of 
one year;117 therefore, students were not denied all educational 
opportunity. According to the court, “[t]he fundamental right to 
an opportunity for an education does not guarantee that a 
student could not temporarily forfeit educational services 
through his own conduct.”118 
Both of the cases described above involve fact situations 
that address expulsion for a year or less. This factual 
distinction is significant for the purpose of legal analysis. In 
Wisconsin, the constitutional deprivation of educational 
services is severe. There is no statutory limitation on the 
length of expulsions.119 There is no requirement for conditional 
reinstatement.120 School district discretion is virtually 
unfettered.121 School districts are permitted to expel students 
for repeated violations of any school rule if “the interest of the 
school demands pupil’s expulsion”—a standard that is not 
defined in the law.122 
V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN WISCONSIN 
None of the cases from other jurisdictions mentioned above 
analyzed the constitutionality of permanent expulsion, as is 
permissible in Wisconsin. The severity of Wisconsin’s expulsion 
statutes, combined with the nature of the right to education in 
the state of Wisconsin, requires the state to modify its statutes. 
Thus, in order to be consistent with its fundamental right to 
education, the state of Wisconsin has at least three types of 
revisions at its disposal: 
 
 115 Id.  
 116 RM v. Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 102 P.3d 868 (Wyo. 2004). 
 117 Id. at 871.  
 118 Id. at 874.  
 119 WIS. STAT. §120.13. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Id.  
 122 WIS. STAT. §120.13(1)(c). 
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(1) First, the Wisconsin State Legislature could limit the scope 
of the law and what is deemed to be an expellable offense. 
Through the use of more specific language, the legislature will 
reserve expulsion only for cases that meet the standard of 
strict scrutiny, thereby eradicating the constitutional 
vulnerability of the overly broad language that the current 
version of the law utilizes. 
(2) Second, the Wisconsin State Legislature could place 
limitations on expulsion orders. These modifications would 
minimize the educational deprivation, thereby making the 
argument for a constitutional violation much less compelling. 
(3) Third, the Wisconsin State Legislature could require that 
school districts provide educational services upon expulsion. 
The arguments set forth in this article are centered on the 
idea that students in Wisconsin are being denied their 
fundamental right to an education. By providing services for 
all students, the state legislature will address the problem at 
its core. 
Each one of the suggestions described above has benefits and 
limitations. The following section will discuss each alternative 
in greater detail. It is important to note, however, that the best 
solution may be a combination of the options described below. 
A. The Use of More Specific Language 
Wisconsin statutes permit permanent expulsion for 
breaking any school rules,123 a result that cannot be justified 
from either a legal or policy perspective. As a threshold 
concern, and in addition to legal concerns regarding permanent 
expulsion addressed earlier in this paper, expelling students to 
the street can have serious societal costs.124 As such, 
circumscribing behaviors that warrant expulsion is a critical 
part of developing expulsion statutes that are prepared to 
defend against legal and policy challenges. In general, loosely 
 
 123 WIS. STAT. §120.13(1)(c).  
 124 Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from 
Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 
1039 (2001); HARVARD UNIV., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE 
AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (2000), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-
discipline/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-
and-school-discipline-policies/. 
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delineated authority has the potential to lead to extreme 
inconsistencies in implementation, oftentimes in ways that 
lead to disciplinary responses that are disproportionate to the 
offenses committed.125 Furthermore, a significant amount of 
research demonstrates that many students are facing expulsion 
for non-safety related reasons.126 A recent study conducted in 
Texas, a state that requires the provision of alternative 
education to expelled students, found that out of a sample 
including 928,940 students, 92.5% of disciplinary actions were 
a result of discretionary decisions based on code of conduct 
violations.127 
Moreover, the flexibility that is written into Wisconsin’s law 
as it stands today has the potential to lead to extreme 
disparities in discipline patterns depending on a student’s race, 
sex, socioeconomic status, or disability category. The Texas 
study referenced above found that students of color were 
proportionately disciplined, as compared to their Caucasian 
classmates, for offenses that required mandatory removal (e.g., 
drug or weapons offenses), while students of color were 
disproportionately disciplined for offenses that allowed for 
discretionary responses.128 Undeniably, disparities in discipline 
are not limited to Texas; in Wisconsin, students with 
disabilities are disciplined more often than students without 
disabilities,129 students of color are expelled more often than 
their Caucasian classmates,130 and male students are expelled 
 
 125 Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega, Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion: 
Questions of Equity and Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK FOR CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: 
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063−89 (Carolyn M. Evertson & 
Carol S. Weinstein eds., 2006). 
 126 Id. at 1068−69. 
 127 TONY FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE 
CARMICHAEL, MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: 
A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 36−37 (2011). Only 5% were related to infractions 
that were defined in state statutes, although considerable discretion still rested in the 
hands of school district administrators. Less than 3% were related to offenses that 
warranted mandatory expulsion under state law.  
 128 Id. at 43.  
 129 Specifically, in 2010−2011, .22% of students with disabilities were expelled. 
That was double the percentage of students without disabilities who were expelled. 
Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What percentage of 
students were suspended or expelled?. 
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).  
 130 In particular, in 2010−2011 the demographic breakdown for expulsions were 
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more often than female students.131 These disparities can have 
serious consequences and undoubtedly interfere with students’ 
equal opportunities for a sound basic education “that will allow 
them to succeed economically and personally,”132 as required by 
law. 
Consequently, expulsion in the State of Wisconsin could be 
reserved to objectively serious offenses. To demonstrate the 
potential for constitutionally infirm outcomes, it is helpful to 
return to the example from an earlier section in this article in 
which a student was expelled from a school district because he 
refused to cover up tattoos that the school board found to be 
offensive.133 Whether the student in this case received 
permanent expulsion for this offense is inconsequential. 
Instead, the example demonstrates that school districts are 
free to expel students for offenses that fail to meet the 
constitutional standard. A denial of educational services for 
such an offense could not possibly meet the standard of strict 
scrutiny. Furthermore, the state has found that two acts of 
defiance are sufficient to meet the “repeated refusal or neglect 
to obey the rules” under Wisconsin’s expulsion statutes.134 
These examples illustrate the types of expellable offenses that 
have the potential to permanently alienate students from the 
public school system. 
 
as follows: American Indian or Alaska Native: 0.16%, Asian .05%, Black or African 
American .60%, Hispanic/Latino .15%, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander .17%, 
White .07, Two or More Races .10%. Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful 
Schools (WINSS), What percentage of students were suspended or expelled?, 
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).  
 131 In 2010−2011, .19% of male students were expelled, while .07% of female 
students were expelled. Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools 
(WINSS), What percentage of students were suspended or expelled?, 
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that the history of superintendent 
expulsion decisions perpetuates these disparities by discouraging local decision makers 
from considering the consistency in application. See, e.g., Nicole R. by Arcadia School 
Dist, (580) Nov, 20, 2002; Benjamin Z., by the Marinette School Dist., (507) March 1, 
2004. Specifically, the decisions support school districts’ decisions to ignore treatment 
of other students since expulsion decisions should be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
 132 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2011). 
 133 H.H. by the West Allis School District, (571) April 21, 2006.  
 134 Russell T. by the School District of Tigerton, (99) June 17, 1982.  
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In response, the state legislature has the option to reserve 
expulsion for serious threats to school safety and serious 
disruptions to the school day. In Connecticut, for example, all 
students are entitled by law to an in-school suspension, as 
opposed to an out-of-school suspension for violations of the 
school code, except in those circumstances where the student 
continues to be a threat to him or herself or others.135 
Wisconsin could apply a similar approach to all disciplinary 
actions. Although district-level discretion should be preserved 
when appropriate, discretionary decision-making that 
implicates constitutional guarantees should not be viewed 
lightly. Taking into account the fact that education is a 
fundamental right in the state of Wisconsin, expulsion for a 
violation of any school rule is a constitutionally impermissible 
use of district-level discretion. 
It is important to note the potential downfalls of this 
approach to statutory modification; for example, using 
language that is too precise may interfere with school districts’ 
ability to meet their immediate safety concerns. Flexibility 
allows school districts to address the wide range of concerns 
that it faces every day. This paper began by stating that the 
goal was not to challenge school districts’ authority to expel 
students. However, the goal of more explicit language would 
not be to infringe upon district authority but to restore the 
constitutional guarantees that the state promised when it 
deemed education to be a fundamental right. 
B. Limitations on Expulsion Orders 
A second alternative is for the state legislature to place 
restrictions on expulsion orders. In a few of the cases described 
above, courts analyzed statutes that placed limitations on the 
duration of expulsions. Similarly, one available option for 
Wisconsin would be to place parameters on expulsions by 
delineating the duration of expulsions. In 2005−2006, 1810 
students were expelled in Wisconsin. Of those 1810 students, 
1184 were expelled for less than a year, 462 were expelled for 
more than a year and 164 were permanently expelled.136 If the 
 
 135 An Act Concerning In-School Suspensions, 2007 Conn. Acts 07-66, 126 (May 
30, 2007). Although the law relates to suspensions, the decision to exclude students 
from school only under circumstances that present a safety threat is can be applied to 
expulsions as well.   
 136 Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What 
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legislature were to adopt an approach that limits expulsion to 
one year, for example, students would be free to return to 
school following their expulsion. A temporary interruption in 
services would make it possible for students to receive their 
constitutionally guaranteed right to an “equal opportunity to a 
sound basic education.”137 
Alternatively, the legislature has the option to require 
reinstatement. This option could take a variety of different 
forms. One approach would be to remove the statutory 
provision that permits school districts to deny enrollment to 
students who are under an expulsion order in any other school 
district in the state.138 However, safety concerns would still 
need to be accounted for under this approach. Therefore, it may 
be advisable to combine this option with some of the options 
described below. 
A second approach would be to require school districts to 
reinstate students, without placing time constraints on when 
that reinstatement must take place. Considerable discretion 
would be left to districts to assess their needs under this 
option. On the other hand, too much discretion in regard to the 
duration of an expulsion order increases the possibility for 
constitutional violations. Requiring conditional reinstatement 
plans may also be a consideration under this approach or as a 
separate third approach.139 With regard to time constraints, the 
legislature could adopt a fourth approach which would require 
school districts to revisit students’ cases periodically to ensure 
that the concerns present at the time of expulsion continue to 
be relevant. Upon reviewing evidence, the state could require 
school districts to readmit students.140 This approach would 
 
happens after students are expelled?, 
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/ExpLength.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=GE’PSERVI
CES&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=
attendance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=AllStudentsFAY&CompareTo=C
URRENTONLY  
 137 Voight, 614 N.W.2d at 396−97.  
 138 WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(f) (2013).  
 139 Although Wisconsin statutes currently permit conditional reinstatement and 
early reinstatement under WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(h) (2013), such actions are not 
required. 
 140 The state legislature might consider adopting a special provision for students 
who are transitioning from the juvenile justice system. Under such circumstances, a 
state agency has deemed the student sufficiently rehabilitated, a determination that 
should be accorded substantial weight in deciding whether a student continues to 
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likely work best when accompanied by greater guidance as to 
what the statute means when it states that the “interest of the 
school demands the pupil’s expulsion.”141 
One strength of these options is that they limit the 
interruption in educational services, which minimizes concerns 
over constitutional violations. On the other hand, the removal 
of school district discretion that occurs when limiting the 
duration of expulsions may prove to be dangerous if a student 
is still not ready to return to a traditional learning 
environment. This is particularly the case under circumstances 
where the legislature mandates a particular maximum for 
expulsion. However, reinstatement plans reestablish local 
discretion by allowing school districts to address needs and 
concerns specific to a given situation. 
C. Provision of Educational Services Post-Expulsion 
The third alternative relates to the provision of educational 
services upon expulsion. Similar to requirements imposed upon 
the state in regard to students with disabilities, the Wisconsin 
legislature could require school districts to provide educational 
services to all students, even those individuals facing 
expulsion. Under this alternative, the state has at least two 
options: (1) to provide alternative educational programming in 
school district facilities, or (2) to provide educational services 
through other means. 
In 2010−2011, 74.3% of students without disabilities who 
were expelled were not offered post-expulsion services for the 
duration of their expulsion.142 The percentage has seen a steady 
incline since 2005−2006, when the percentage of students 
without disabilities who were not offered post-expulsion 
services was 43.2%.143 These statistics are in sharp contrast to 
DPI policy, which encourages school districts to provide 
alternative education to students facing discipline. The state 
has the choice to reserve exceptions for students whose 
presence poses a threat to safety under either one of these 
options. However, in light of the fact that federal special 
 
present a threat to school safety.   
 141 WIS. STAT § 120.13(1)(c)(1) (2013).  
 142 Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What 
happens after students are expelled?, 
http://wisedash.dpi.wi.gov/Dashboard/portalHome.jsp. 
 143 Id. 
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education law requires the provision of post-expulsion services 
for students with disabilities, the argument that a general 
education student’s behavior is so severe that safety concerns 
necessitate a complete termination of services seems much less 
compelling. 
One potential downfall of this approach, depending on how 
it is structured, is that the availability of alternative education 
may encourage the use of disciplinary exclusion from the 
traditional academic setting. This concern is particularly 
important because it has the potential to lead to segregated 
learning environments for students with disabilities, students 
of color, and male students. As such, emphasis should be placed 
on expulsion as a last resort and patterns should be monitored. 
Nonetheless, providing educational services to all students is 
the most reliable way to avoid a constitutional violation. 
VI. ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY CHANGE 
Although the focus of this article is state-level action, 
concerned school leaders need not wait for the state legislature 
to act. No legal barrier prohibits school districts from providing 
greater protection than is provided under the current statutory 
scheme. Each of the alternatives and their corresponding 
options could be implemented at the district level. In fact, some 
school districts have already exercised this authority in 
creating alternative education programs and alternative 
schools.144 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Education was deemed a fundamental right in the state of 
Wisconsin due to its paramount importance. Unfortunately, the 
state’s expulsion laws do not reflect such an esteemed status 
and face a serious risk of being found unconstitutional. This 
article began with three questions that remain unanswered in 
the wake of Madison Metropolitan School District. 
The first question asked if Wisconsin statutes are 
 
 144 WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ALTERNATIVES TO EXPULSION: CASE 
STUDIES OF WISCONSIN SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2009), available at 
http://sspw.dpi.wi.gov/files/sspw/pdf/expulsionalts.pdf. 
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constitutional under the state constitution. This article has 
demonstrated that Wisconsin statutes are unconstitutional in 
that they allow for expulsion without services under 
circumstances that fail to meet the rigorous legal standard. In 
fact, contextual evidence demonstrates that the laws fail to 
meet even a rational basis standard. 
The second question asked when, if at all, students are 
entitled to post-expulsion services or alternative education in 
the state of Wisconsin. At the very least, students facing 
expulsion are entitled to an education in cases when the 
student does not present a serious safety threat or a serious 
interference with a school district’s ability to educate students. 
Arguably, educational services can even be provided under 
these circumstances, although potentially through alternative 
means. 
The third question asked the ways that the state legislature 
can modify the state’s expulsion laws so that they are 
consistent with the state constitution. As this article has 
argued, the Wisconsin state legislature can revise the statutes 
through the use of more specific language, by placing 
limitations on expulsion orders, and by providing a means for 
students to receive an education upon expulsion (see Appendix 
A). In the absence of such legislative action, the State of 
Wisconsin will continue to undermine Voight’s constitutionally 
guaranteed commitment to “a sound basic education . . . . that 
will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them 
to succeed economically and personally.”145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2011). 
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APPENDIX A 
 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
 Scope of the 
Law  
Limitations on 
Expulsion Order 
Educational 
Services Upon 
Expulsion 
Option 1 Use more 
specific 
language that: 
–Narrows the 
definition of 
expellable 
offenses 
–Defines 
“interest of the 
school demands 
the pupil’s 
expulsion” 
 
Limit duration of 
expulsions 
Require post-
expulsion 
services: 
–For all 
students 
–For all 
students except 
those whose 
presence 
threatens safety 
 
Option 2 Remove 
provision that 
allows school 
districts to 
expel student 
for any school 
rule and replace 
it with stronger 
language 
Require 
reinstatement 
–Remove 
provision that 
permits school 
districts to deny 
enrollment for 
students under 
expulsion order 
–Require 
conditional 
reinstatement 
 
Require 
alternative 
education: 
–For all 
students 
–For all 
students except 
those whose 
presence 
threatens safety 
 
*The appropriate solution may be a combination of these 
alternatives or options 
 
